RARE! WWII 1944 Operation CAUSEWAY U.S. Invasion of Formosa (Taiwan) Air and Gunnery Target Map

RARE! WWII 1944 Operation CAUSEWAY U.S. Invasion of Formosa (Taiwan) Air and Gunnery Target Map

$1,250.00

Comes with a hand-signed C.O.A.

Operation: CAUSEWAY: The TOP SECRET Invasion that never was: "The (US) Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided that our first major objective in the war against Japan will be the vital Luzon-Formosa-China Coast area...with an occupation of Formosa by target date 15 Oct. 1945” Half a million American troops. More than 4000 ships. Thousands of aircraft. In the summer of 1944, American military stratagists had begun preparartions for Operation Causeway, the codename for a massive invasion of Taiwan by air, sea and land.

This WWII original and extremely rare gunnery target map/aerial photograph overlay is a rare print “FIRST EDITION - AMS 2” target map used for both naval, air, and ground artillery fire coordination in preparation for Operation Causeway, the planned United States invasion of Formosa (Taiwan) during World War II.

According to the planners, Formosa would have provided a suitable base for the strategic bombing campaign against Japan as well as a staging area for the foreseen invasion of the Japanese home islands. Its planned capture was also seen as a symbolic demonstration of American support for the continued participation of China in the war against Japan. Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, was a high-profile supporter of the Formosa plan. He was opposed by General Douglas MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the South West Pacific Area, who pushed for the invasion of Luzon in the Philippines and argued for bypassing Formosa. Admiral Raymond Spruance, commanding the Fifth Fleet, concurred with MacArthur that Operation Causeway was unrealistic without further significant reinforcements in the Pacific theater; instead, Spruance proposed the capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the latter an island smaller than Formosa and therefore not requiring additional troops diverted from Europe. At a high-level meeting in Pearl Harbor in July 1944, President Roosevelt conferred with General MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Both commanders balked at Operation Causeway and advised the president accordingly. Instead MacArthur's plan for the invasion of Luzon and Spruance's proposals were put into operation.

This target map was one of the most intricate target map types created during the Pacific Theater campaign. Using the most updated aerial photography photographs of the island this map would have been used during Operation Causeway to target JAPANESE COASTAL DEFENSES, HEAVY AA, ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENTS, PILLBOXES, BLOCKHOUSES, MACHINE G. EMPLACEMENTS, RADAR, AIRFIELDS, RARIO TOWERS, ANTI TANK TRENCHES, ETC.

Targeting Fortress Formosa

It almost happened. Fifty-three years ago, military planners in Washington and the Pacific Command were putting the final touches to a plan to accelerate the defeat of Japan through the invasion of the Japanese home islands. The target: Taiwan.

In 1944, Taiwan, or Formosa as it was still known in the West, was entering it's 49th year within the Japanese empire, a part of the euphemistically-titled East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. From the earliest days of the Pacific war, Taiwan had proven its worth to its colonial masters, making considerable contributions to the Japanese war effort. From Taiwanese ports and airfields a reliable stream of men and material for Japanese operations had poured into the Philippines, the Malayan Peninsula and Indonesia.

"Taiwan was a transfer base for troops going between Japan and Southeast Asia, it was a good place to stockpile supplies," explains amateur military historian and former US consular officer in Taiwan, Robert B. Sheeks. "Taiwan also produced a lot of rice and other food the Japanese needed. "For the Japanese, Taiwan was like Japan's food bowl," Sheeks says.

Manpower was also a significant contribution Taiwan made to the Japanese war effort. Taiwanese conscripts were assigned to fight in the Pacific theater. Taiwanese aboriginal recruits in the Japanese Imperial Army proved particularly valuable in the Japanese offensive against American forces in the Philippines in 1941 and 1942. "Some of the aborigines from Taiwan were specially recruited to take part in the assault on Corregidor and Bataan," Sheeks says.

In spite of its role within the Japanese military machine, until mid 1944, the Pacific war remained, for most Taiwanese, a matter of newsreel footage and reports from Japanese troops in transit between combat areas. However, by the second half of 1944, events on the other side of the world had conspired to transform Taiwan from its position of safe obscurity to a point of essential strategic importance for the Allied Command.

For officers in Washington and throughout the Pacific, Taiwan was increasingly perceived as a key jumping-off point for the long-anticipated invasion of the Japanese home islands. "The Anglo-American invasion of France had succeeded and Army General MacArthur and Naval Admiral Nimitz were battering the inner ring of Japan's defenses from the Marianas and Western New Guinea." writes Phil Spector in his history of the Pacific war, "Eagle Against the Sun." "The question was where to go next."

Admiral Ernest King, US Chief of Naval Operations, was determined that Taiwan would be next. According to historian David Sommerville in his book "World War II, Day By Day," King perceived the capture of Taiwan as essential for "strangling" the Japanese home islands. "Admiral King believed that all sea and air lines of communication from Japan south could be effectively throttled by holding the Marianas, Formosa and a foothold on the China coast," Sommerville writes.

While the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had anticipated the necessity of an invasion of Taiwan in its "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan" in the spring of 1943, Allied military successes in Europe had made the invasion of Taiwan appear far more realistic and achievable. The result was "Operation Causeway," a detailed outline of the assumptions, objectives and logistics of a massive land air, sea and land invasion of "Formosa and Amoy."

Issued on June 21, 1944, the now-declassified preliminary draft of Operation Causeway, stamped "Top Secret" and "Officer to Officer Handling Only", provides a fascinating and detailed glimpse of how the US planned to assualt Taiwan. The draft envisioned a successful invasion of Taiwan as an essential component in the defeat of Japan.

The elimination of Taiwan as supply depot and transfer point for Japanese troops, the island's easy access to Nationalist-held airfields on the eastern coast of China, as well as Taiwan's position as a convenient jumping-off point for attacks by American bombers on the Japanese home islands, made control of Taiwan seem extremely attractive to military planners. "(The invasion's) successful completion will permit the establishment of our forces in positions from which all parts of Japan may be bombed," the Operation Causeway preliminary draft predicted.

To invade and occupy Taiwan, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff' planned the largest invading force yet seen in the war. An attacking force of 302,000 US Army troops and 100,000 marines supported by thousands more in planes and ships, matched even the huge force which had taken part in the June 6 D-Day landings in France. However, later estimates regarding the scale of the invasion indicate that the numbers of troops required would have been even higher.

"I think the official estimates of what the invasion would have required were optimistic," Sheeks says today. "Considering the size of Taiwan and the traditional military ratio of having an invasion force at least three times larger than the defending forces, the true number of US forces necessary for the invasion would have been closer to 500,000, including land, sea, air and logistical support," he says.

Landing at four beachheads on Taiwan's southern coast between Kaoshiung and Kenting, the attacking forces would have consolidated control of the southern third of the island and then proceeded northward along the west coast toward the Japanese colonial administrative center at Taipei. "Development of airfields and port facilities devoted to bombing Japan would have been operational within the first couple of weeks of the invasion." Sheeks says. "Within 2-3 months, the island would effectively have been under Allied control for all practical purposes."

In spite of the intricately painstaking detail of Operation Causeway's preliminary draft, Taiwan was spared the onslaught of American military might by problems caused by the sheer scale of the invasion. Estimates of the troop numbers necessary for the invasion exceeded the number available in the entire Pacific area at the time, requiring the invasion to be postponed until a massive transfer of troops from the European theater of the war could be transferred to the Pacific. In light of this fact, General MacArthur's promise of a faster, easier route to the Japanese home islands by bypassing Taiwan and pursuing an invasion of the island of Luzon, proved persuasive to military planners at the time.

At the same time, one of the main strategic attractions and assumptions of the proposed invasion - the access to Allied-controlled air bases on the East China coast - vanished, as the result of a preemptive strike by Japanese forces. "The Japanese had correctly guessed that the US would try to support an invasion of Japan from China," Sheeks explains," so they quickly launched their own attacks to forestall this possibility, and occupied all airfields and ports along the East China coast."

In the end, General Douglas MacArthur's promise to "return" to the Philippines he abandoned in 1942 proved to be the decisive factor in shelving Operation Causeway. The proposal to take Taiwan was a threat to MacArthur's ambition to fulfill his dramatic vow, and he fought Operation Causeway tooth and claw in favor of "island-hopping" up the Philippines archipelago. "MacArthur had tunnel vision," Robert Sheeks says of the famous general's desire to reconquer the Philippines. "He wanted to return to the Philippines to the exclusion of other alternatives."

Map shown above provided, Courtesy of Robert B. Sheeks. A copy of the original battle plan for the military assault codenamed Operation Causeway, which would have sent hundreds of thousands of US Army, Navy and Air Force personnel pouring into Taiwan in an attempt to overwhelm the occupying Japanese forces. This top secret 1944 document has recently been declassified by the US Government.

MacArthur's popularity with the American public has led some military historians to conclude that President Roosevelt secretly traded his support for a Philippines invasion in return for the general's support in the upcoming presidential election in 1945. "MacArthur had not only force of personality, he had appeal to the American public who agreed with him when he said 'We should go back (to the Philippines)," Sheeks says. "MacArthur had the ability to attract or deflect votes for Roosevelt and some analysts conclude that a deal was struck between them."

On October 3, 1944, the decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bypass Taiwan in favor of MacArthur's Philippine island strategy spelled the end of Operation Causeway. Taiwan was left, in MacArthur's words, "to wither on the vine." Although Taiwan was still subject to continual air attacks from 1943 to 1945, the abandonment of Operation Causeway spared the island massive devastation and the lives of thousands of Taiwanese civilians as well as those of Japanese and American troops. "A terrible tragedy was averted," Sheeks points out.

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